// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package aes
import (
"crypto/cipher"
subtleoverlap "crypto/internal/subtle"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"internal/cpu"
)
// This file contains two implementations of AES-GCM. The first implementation
// (gcmAsm) uses the KMCTR instruction to encrypt using AES in counter mode and
// the KIMD instruction for GHASH. The second implementation (gcmKMA) uses the
// newer KMA instruction which performs both operations.
// gcmCount represents a 16-byte big-endian count value.
type gcmCount [16]byte
// inc increments the rightmost 32-bits of the count value by 1.
func (x *gcmCount) inc() {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(x[len(x)-4:], binary.BigEndian.Uint32(x[len(x)-4:])+1)
}
// gcmLengths writes len0 || len1 as big-endian values to a 16-byte array.
func gcmLengths(len0, len1 uint64) [16]byte {
v := [16]byte{}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v[0:], len0)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v[8:], len1)
return v
}
// gcmHashKey represents the 16-byte hash key required by the GHASH algorithm.
type gcmHashKey [16]byte
type gcmAsm struct {
block *aesCipherAsm
hashKey gcmHashKey
nonceSize int
tagSize int
}
const (
gcmBlockSize = 16
gcmTagSize = 16
gcmMinimumTagSize = 12 // NIST SP 800-38D recommends tags with 12 or more bytes.
gcmStandardNonceSize = 12
)
var errOpen = errors.New("cipher: message authentication failed")
// Assert that aesCipherAsm implements the gcmAble interface.
var _ gcmAble = (*aesCipherAsm)(nil)
// NewGCM returns the AES cipher wrapped in Galois Counter Mode. This is only
// called by crypto/cipher.NewGCM via the gcmAble interface.
func (c *aesCipherAsm) NewGCM(nonceSize, tagSize int) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
var hk gcmHashKey
c.Encrypt(hk[:], hk[:])
g := gcmAsm{
block: c,
hashKey: hk,
nonceSize: nonceSize,
tagSize: tagSize,
}
if cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM {
g := gcmKMA{g}
return &g, nil
}
return &g, nil
}
func (g *gcmAsm) NonceSize() int {
return g.nonceSize
}
func (g *gcmAsm) Overhead() int {
return g.tagSize
}
// sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes. It returns a
// slice with the contents of the given slice followed by that many bytes and a
// second slice that aliases into it and contains only the extra bytes. If the
// original slice has sufficient capacity then no allocation is performed.
func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) {
if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total {
head = in[:total]
} else {
head = make([]byte, total)
copy(head, in)
}
tail = head[len(in):]
return
}
// ghash uses the GHASH algorithm to hash data with the given key. The initial
// hash value is given by hash which will be updated with the new hash value.
// The length of data must be a multiple of 16-bytes.
//go:noescape
func ghash(key *gcmHashKey, hash *[16]byte, data []byte)
// paddedGHASH pads data with zeroes until its length is a multiple of
// 16-bytes. It then calculates a new value for hash using the GHASH algorithm.
func (g *gcmAsm) paddedGHASH(hash *[16]byte, data []byte) {
siz := len(data) &^ 0xf // align size to 16-bytes
if siz > 0 {
ghash(&g.hashKey, hash, data[:siz])
data = data[siz:]
}
if len(data) > 0 {
var s [16]byte
copy(s[:], data)
ghash(&g.hashKey, hash, s[:])
}
}
// cryptBlocksGCM encrypts src using AES in counter mode using the given
// function code and key. The rightmost 32-bits of the counter are incremented
// between each block as required by the GCM spec. The initial counter value
// is given by cnt, which is updated with the value of the next counter value
// to use.
//
// The lengths of both dst and buf must be greater than or equal to the length
// of src. buf may be partially or completely overwritten during the execution
// of the function.
//go:noescape
func cryptBlocksGCM(fn code, key, dst, src, buf []byte, cnt *gcmCount)
// counterCrypt encrypts src using AES in counter mode and places the result
// into dst. cnt is the initial count value and will be updated with the next
// count value. The length of dst must be greater than or equal to the length
// of src.
func (g *gcmAsm) counterCrypt(dst, src []byte, cnt *gcmCount) {
// Copying src into a buffer improves performance on some models when
// src and dst point to the same underlying array. We also need a
// buffer for counter values.
var ctrbuf, srcbuf [2048]byte
for len(src) >= 16 {
siz := len(src)
if len(src) > len(ctrbuf) {
siz = len(ctrbuf)
}
siz &^= 0xf // align siz to 16-bytes
copy(srcbuf[:], src[:siz])
cryptBlocksGCM(g.block.function, g.block.key, dst[:siz], srcbuf[:siz], ctrbuf[:], cnt)
src = src[siz:]
dst = dst[siz:]
}
if len(src) > 0 {
var x [16]byte
g.block.Encrypt(x[:], cnt[:])
for i := range src {
dst[i] = src[i] ^ x[i]
}
cnt.inc()
}
}
// deriveCounter computes the initial GCM counter state from the given nonce.
// See NIST SP 800-38D, section 7.1.
func (g *gcmAsm) deriveCounter(nonce []byte) gcmCount {
// GCM has two modes of operation with respect to the initial counter
// state: a "fast path" for 96-bit (12-byte) nonces, and a "slow path"
// for nonces of other lengths. For a 96-bit nonce, the nonce, along
// with a four-byte big-endian counter starting at one, is used
// directly as the starting counter. For other nonce sizes, the counter
// is computed by passing it through the GHASH function.
var counter gcmCount
if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize {
copy(counter[:], nonce)
counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1
} else {
var hash [16]byte
g.paddedGHASH(&hash, nonce)
lens := gcmLengths(0, uint64(len(nonce))*8)
g.paddedGHASH(&hash, lens[:])
copy(counter[:], hash[:])
}
return counter
}
// auth calculates GHASH(ciphertext, additionalData), masks the result with
// tagMask and writes the result to out.
func (g *gcmAsm) auth(out, ciphertext, additionalData []byte, tagMask *[gcmTagSize]byte) {
var hash [16]byte
g.paddedGHASH(&hash, additionalData)
g.paddedGHASH(&hash, ciphertext)
lens := gcmLengths(uint64(len(additionalData))*8, uint64(len(ciphertext))*8)
g.paddedGHASH(&hash, lens[:])
copy(out, hash[:])
for i := range out {
out[i] ^= tagMask[i]
}
}
// Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext. See the cipher.AEAD interface for
// details.
func (g *gcmAsm) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
}
if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*BlockSize {
panic("crypto/cipher: message too large for GCM")
}
ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+g.tagSize)
if subtleoverlap.InexactOverlap(out[:len(plaintext)], plaintext) {
panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
}
counter := g.deriveCounter(nonce)
var tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
g.block.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
counter.inc()
var tagOut [gcmTagSize]byte
g.counterCrypt(out, plaintext, &counter)
g.auth(tagOut[:], out[:len(plaintext)], data, &tagMask)
copy(out[len(plaintext):], tagOut[:])
return ret
}
// Open authenticates and decrypts ciphertext. See the cipher.AEAD interface
// for details.
func (g *gcmAsm) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
}
// Sanity check to prevent the authentication from always succeeding if an implementation
// leaves tagSize uninitialized, for example.
if g.tagSize < gcmMinimumTagSize {
panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect GCM tag size")
}
if len(ciphertext) < g.tagSize {
return nil, errOpen
}
if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(BlockSize)+uint64(g.tagSize) {
return nil, errOpen
}
tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize:]
ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize]
counter := g.deriveCounter(nonce)
var tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
g.block.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
counter.inc()
var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte
g.auth(expectedTag[:], ciphertext, data, &tagMask)
ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
if subtleoverlap.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:g.tagSize], tag) != 1 {
// The AESNI code decrypts and authenticates concurrently, and
// so overwrites dst in the event of a tag mismatch. That
// behavior is mimicked here in order to be consistent across
// platforms.
for i := range out {
out[i] = 0
}
return nil, errOpen
}
g.counterCrypt(out, ciphertext, &counter)
return ret, nil
}
// gcmKMA implements the cipher.AEAD interface using the KMA instruction. It should
// only be used if hasKMA is true.
type gcmKMA struct {
gcmAsm
}
// flags for the KMA instruction
const (
kmaHS = 1 << 10 // hash subkey supplied
kmaLAAD = 1 << 9 // last series of additional authenticated data
kmaLPC = 1 << 8 // last series of plaintext or ciphertext blocks
kmaDecrypt = 1 << 7 // decrypt
)
// kmaGCM executes the encryption or decryption operation given by fn. The tag
// will be calculated and written to tag. cnt should contain the current
// counter state and will be overwritten with the updated counter state.
// TODO(mundaym): could pass in hash subkey
//go:noescape
func kmaGCM(fn code, key, dst, src, aad []byte, tag *[16]byte, cnt *gcmCount)
// Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext. See the cipher.AEAD interface for
// details.
func (g *gcmKMA) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
}
if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*BlockSize {
panic("crypto/cipher: message too large for GCM")
}
ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+g.tagSize)
if subtleoverlap.InexactOverlap(out[:len(plaintext)], plaintext) {
panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
}
counter := g.deriveCounter(nonce)
fc := g.block.function | kmaLAAD | kmaLPC
var tag [gcmTagSize]byte
kmaGCM(fc, g.block.key, out[:len(plaintext)], plaintext, data, &tag, &counter)
copy(out[len(plaintext):], tag[:])
return ret
}
// Open authenticates and decrypts ciphertext. See the cipher.AEAD interface
// for details.
func (g *gcmKMA) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
}
if len(ciphertext) < g.tagSize {
return nil, errOpen
}
if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(BlockSize)+uint64(g.tagSize) {
return nil, errOpen
}
tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize:]
ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize]
ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
if subtleoverlap.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
}
if g.tagSize < gcmMinimumTagSize {
panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect GCM tag size")
}
counter := g.deriveCounter(nonce)
fc := g.block.function | kmaLAAD | kmaLPC | kmaDecrypt
var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte
kmaGCM(fc, g.block.key, out[:len(ciphertext)], ciphertext, data, &expectedTag, &counter)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:g.tagSize], tag) != 1 {
// The AESNI code decrypts and authenticates concurrently, and
// so overwrites dst in the event of a tag mismatch. That
// behavior is mimicked here in order to be consistent across
// platforms.
for i := range out {
out[i] = 0
}
return nil, errOpen
}
return ret, nil
}
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